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Abstract
The use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) embodies a specific vision of agricultural systems that is highly contro-
versial. The article focuses on how conflicts over GMOs contribute towards food democracy. Food democracy is defined
as the possibility for all social groups to participate in, negotiate and struggle over how societies organize agricultural
production, thereby ensuring that food systems fulfil the needs of people and sustain (re)productive nature into the fu-
ture. EU agricultural policy envisages the coexistence of agricultural and food systems with and without GMOs. This policy,
which on the surface appears to be ameans of avoiding conflict, has in fact exacerbated conflict, while creating obstacles to
the development of food democracy. By contrast, empirical analysis of movements against GMOs in Germany and Poland
shows how they create pathways towards participation in the food system and the creation of alternative agricultural fu-
tures, thereby contributing to a democratization of food systems and thus of society–nature relations. Today, as products
of new breeding techniques such as genome editing are being released, these movements are gaining new relevance.
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1. Introduction
Since the 1970s, and even more since the early 2000s,
various socio-environmental struggles in policy fields
such as climate, energy, mobility and, not least, food
can be identified as part of a new movement concerned
with the democratization of society–nature relations.
Struggles against the implementation of geneticallymod-
ified plants and animals in agriculture are an essential
part of themovement for food democracy, inwhich “agri-
cultural policy is perceived as a citizens’ affair” (Haerlin,
2013, p. 47, authors’ translation).
Conflicts over food relations are processes in which
participation in policy making and forms of agricultural
production and consumption are struggled over and
(temporarily) decided. In this study, we focus on con-
flicts over genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in agri-
culture and analyse their contribution to food democ-
racy. The application of genetic engineering has given
rise to a large number of social conflicts, from scien-
tific debates regarding the safety and appropriate use of
the technology, to disputes among agricultural produc-
ers and conflicts involving consumers (cf. Friedrich, 2015;
Levidow & Carr, 2010). In addition to highlighting key is-
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sues raised by the development of GMOs these conflicts
raise broader questions: regarding what kind of agricul-
ture is desirable, what kinds of food should be produced,
what kinds of technology should be used, and who
should have access to and control over these technolo-
gies, among others. Moreover, laws and other policies
intended to resolve these disputes themselves become
the object of new conflicts (Gottschlich, Sulmowski, &
Friedrich, 2017). Our research question is: How do con-
flicts over GMOs contribute to a democratization of
society–nature relations? How the way these conflicts
are dealt with over time shapes specific constellations
of society–nature relations that can also be more or
less democratic, in the sense that participation becomes
more or less possible or that conflicts give rise to out-
comes that are more or less sustainable. In the empirical
examples below, the focus is specifically on how and to
what extent such conflicts enable food democracy. The
analytical findings of this study not only shed light on
the constitution of food democracy, but can also be help-
ful for understanding how conflicts in other policy fields,
such as energy or mobility, contribute to a democratiza-
tion of society–nature relations.
After outlining our conceptual framework (Section 2),
we describe the context for our empirical case study of
the movements against GMOs in Germany and Poland
and present the results (Section 3). This is followed
by a discussion of our findings regarding the contribu-
tion of conflicts surrounding GMOs to food democracy
(Section 4). The final section summarizes our argument
and considers new issues raised by the further develop-
ment of GMOs and new breeding techniques (Section 5).
2. Conceptual Framework: Substantive and Procedural
Dimensions of Food Democracy from a
Critical-Emancipatory Perspective
Food democracy can be defined as the possibility for
all social groups to participate in, negotiate and strug-
gle over how societies organize agricultural production,
thereby ensuring that food systems fulfil the needs of
people and sustain (re)productive nature into the future.
We followHassanein (2003, p. 83), who argues that “food
democracy ideally means that all members of an agro-
food system have equal and effective opportunities for
participation in shaping that system, as well as knowl-
edge about the relevant alternative ways of designing
and operating the system.” Hassanein (2003, p. 85) con-
siders food democracy as a pragmatic device for incre-
mental change towards a radical transformation of the
food system and places active participation and politi-
cal engagement (e.g., social movements that exert pres-
sure on existing social structures) at the core of food
democracy. Similarly, Petetinmaintains that food democ-
racy is about empowering people to influence food sys-
tems, leading towards “a more sustainable and just so-
ciety where the public can actively participate in the
decision-making process for foods” (Petetin, 2016, p. 1).
While recognizing the importance of participation, in this
study we adopt a broader definition of food democracy.
We draw on Fraser’s (2009) work on democracy and
justice to differentiate between: (1) the procedural di-
mension of food democracy, i.e., participatory processes
leading to the creation of spaces for debate, negotiation
and protest; and (2) the substantive dimension of food
democracy, i.e., the outcomes and impacts of specific
modes of agricultural production.
With regard to the procedural dimension, we agree
with Barber (1984/2003) that direct participation is im-
perative for a ‘strong democracy’ that goes beyond
mere representation (cf. Behringer & Feindt, 2019).
Participation may take various forms: from taking part in
institutionalized negotiation processes to resistance and
civil disobedience. It may also take place on different lev-
els, giving rise to social change through top-down devel-
opment of policies and associated legislation, or through
bottom-up engagement in grassroots activities, includ-
ing boycotts and protests. Participation is structured by
other social relations that determine access to resources
or influence the emergence of social inequalities, includ-
ing class and gender (Fraser, 2009). This emphasis on par-
ticipation encompasses important aspects of the food
sovereignty debate (Carlson & Chapell, 2015). As a “so-
cial movement” (Petetin, 2016, p. 1) and “a set of de-
mands from below” (Lang, 1999, p. 218), the political
movement for food sovereignty emergedout of struggles
to counter neoliberal trade, distribution, land-use and
resource regimes that are asymmetrical and limit or ex-
clude large groups of people from participation in shap-
ing the future of food systems (McMichael, 2014). The
availability of spaces for public debate and negotiation,
for protest and resistance, also constitutes an important
condition for food democracy. Demands for both food
democracy and food sovereignty go beyond ‘voting with
your fork,’ recognising that achieving sustainable agricul-
tural systems will require structural changes in power re-
lations, decision-making, and in “howwe do democracy”
(Carlson & Chapell, 2015, p. 7, emphasis in original).
At the same time, we maintain that substantive out-
comes of the food system are equally important for
food democracy. One important substantive outcome
identified in debates surrounding food sovereignty and
democracy is sustainability (Hassanein, 2003, p. 78; Loos
et al., 2014; Petetin, 2016, p. 2; Wittman, 2011). Here,
we highlight care and justice as essential elements of
sustainability (Gottschlich & Bellina, 2016). Specifically,
our understanding of sustainability is based on the
concept of a care-centred economy that includes car-
ing not only for people but also for “more than hu-
man worlds” (Gottschlich & Katz, 2018, p. 84; see also
Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017). To maintain and sustain
the ‘(re)productivity of society and nature’ (Biesecker
& Hofmeister, 2010), caring practices should be placed
at the core of democracy (Tronto, 2013). From this
standpoint, food democracy includes caring agricultural
politics and practices, such as those that ensure soil
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(re)productivity and the wellbeing of animals. This is in
stark contrast to the dominant corporate-driven agrifood
system, characterized by injustice and externalization of
the negative ecological and social effects of industrial-
ized, high-input agriculture (e.g., deforestation, pollution,
and health risks of pesticides). In this sense, Lang (1999,
p. 217) and Petetin (2016, p. 1) distinguish between ‘food
democracy’ and the current system of ‘food control.’
A caring food democracy that seeks to overcome ex-
ternalization has to be oriented towards intra- and in-
tergenerational justice and achieving equal opportuni-
ties and dignified living conditions for all. This includes
fair labour standards, protecting the health of produc-
ers and consumers, and addressing the inequitable dis-
tribution of negative social and environmental effects
along the lines of class, gender, geography, or towards
future generations (Ahlem & Hammas, 2017; Brand &
Wissen, 2017; Mcintyre, Herren, Wakhungu, & Watson,
2009). As a corollary of care and justice, the precaution-
ary principle—incorporated in 1971 into the first envi-
ronmental program of the German Federal Government
(1971, p. 7)—is also essential to the substantive dimen-
sion of food democracy, in order to leave room for
manoeuvre in decision-making for future generations.
This goes against the dominant principles and practices
of the present-day food system that tend to favour
technological innovation, even to the extent of calling
the precautionary principle into question (von Gleich &
Petschow, 2017).
In this article, our analysis of the interplay of pro-
cedural and substantive dimensions of food democracy
is informed by a critical-emancipatory understanding of
sustainability (Gottschlich, 2017a) which emphasizes the
importance of care, justice and the precautionary princi-
ple. The question of what constitutes justice and care is
always controversial. Therefore, we consider conflicts—
i.e., the public expression of contradictory ideas, inter-
ests, needs and practices—as central and productive el-
ements of food democracy (and of democratic society–
nature relations in general) because they drive change
and transformation (for another conceptual understand-
ing of food democracy that embraces conflict and con-
testation as one dimension of food democracy, see also
Bornemann and Weiland, 2019). We argue that conflict-
driven forms of politics play a vital role in the creation
of food democracy from a critical-emancipatory perspec-
tive (Gottschlich & Hackfort, 2016; see also Lang, 1999,
p. 217). A critical-emancipatory approach to sustainabil-
ity calls certainties into question (Gottschlich & Mölders,
2017, p. 37). In conflicts over the future of agriculture,
it is precisely such purported certainties (e.g., the pos-
itive effects of the industrialization of agriculture) that
break down. These (and other) conflicts can be analysed
taking different aspects into account, such as the focus
of conflict, the actors involved, the type of conflict ac-
tion, the conflict settlement, and the effects of the con-
flict (Bornemann & Saretzki, 2018). As explained above,
we consider it useful, in analysing conflicts like those
over food democracy, to distinguish the substantive di-
mension from the procedural one. In our analysis, we
consider the question of participation and the actors in-
volved (e.g., movements), the settlement of conflicts by
specific policies (e.g., coexistence policy) as well as the
material and discursive effects of conflicts (e.g., the in-
troduction of GMOs into ecosystems and the promotion
of new kinds of agriculture and their different underlying
views of nature).
3. Empirical Case Study
3.1. GMO Policy in Germany and Poland
At first sight, our research question seems to be of
limited relevance to Europe, where the use of GMOs
is relatively restricted compared to countries such as
the United States, Brazil or Argentina. EU policy on
GMOs envisages the coexistence, within Europe, of agri-
cultural and food systems with and without GMOs. To
date only two genetically modified (GM) crops have
been cultivated commercially in Europe: MON810, a GM
maize variety (currently cultivated primarily in Spain);
and Amflora, a GM potato, which was cultivated com-
mercially in a number of European countries between
2010 and 2011 (International Service for the Acquisition
of Agri-biotech Applications, 2017). Apart from these
commercial varieties, other GMOs have been released
experimentally in Europe since the 1990s. European
regulations also allow the import of animal feed con-
taining GMOs. The EU’s ‘coexistence policy,’ first set
out in Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release
into the environment of genetically modified organisms
(European Parliament & Council of the EU, 2001), frames
national-level GMO policy in both Germany and Poland.
However, there are a number of differences between
GMO policies in the two countries. In Germany, where
the cultivation of GMOs is regulated by the Genetic
Engineering Act (GenTG), MON810 was cultivated com-
mercially between 2005 and 2008 (before being banned
in April 2009), and Amflora in 2010 and 2011, in both
cases accompanied by protests and conflicts in the local-
ities where they were grown.
In Poland, the release of GMOs for commercial pur-
poses and the marketing of genetically modified feed
have both been prohibited (by the Seed Act and the
Feed Act, respectively) since 2006. However, although
the 2006 Polish Seed Act prohibited the inclusion of
GM varieties in the Polish national seed registry and the
marketing of such varieties, cultivation for farmers’ own
needs (e.g., to feed their own animals) and issues relat-
ing to the declaration of such cultivation were not cov-
ered by the legislation. These legal loopholes allowed
farmers to acquireMON810maize in neighbouring coun-
tries and cultivate it in their fields, particularly in south-
ern Poland (Sulmowski, 2017, p. 212). In 2008, the Polish
Supreme Chamber of Control ruled that regulations did
not yet provide sufficient protection against the uncon-
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 4, Pages 165–177 167
trolled spread of GMOs. However, this ruling did not im-
mediately bring an end to the ‘unofficial’ cultivation of
GM maize.
In both Germany and Poland, no GMOs have been
cultivated (officially) in recent years, with the excep-
tion of some research-related experiments. Due to the
intense conflicts they provoked, experimental releases
of GMOs have also been suspended in Germany since
2014. One important pro-GMO player, the chemical com-
pany BASF, justified its withdrawal from the genetic en-
gineering business in Germany in 2012 with reference
to the lack of acceptance of the technology among the
majority of consumers, farmers and politicians. In 2015,
Germany and Poland opted out of future cultivation of
MON810, taking advantage of a recent amendment to
EU legislation (European Parliament & Council of the
EU, 2015) that makes it possible for member states to
ban single GMO varieties, either because of their im-
pacts on ecosystems, or in response to political con-
flicts. This possibility of opting out could be an option to
strengthen food democracy (see Table 1). The decision
by the European Court of Justice of 25 July 2018 to con-
sider organisms produced by new breeding techniques
(such as Genome Editing) as GMOs in the sense of the
Release Directive 2001/18/EC (European Parliament &
Council the EU, 2001) represents a further success for
the anti-GMO movement, which had fought for such a
classification. However, in the future, both Germany and
Poland could conceivably approve other GMOs or new
breeding techniques for cultivation, in response to sus-
tained lobbying by powerful interest groups, as well as a
resurgence of calls by politicians and economists for ex-
isting regulations to be watered down. Thus, the use and
handling of GMOs remains controversial.
3.2. Methods
Wechose to studymovements against GMOs inGermany
and Poland as exemplars of West and East European
countries. In this article, we discuss the extent to which
the movements in the two countries have been success-
ful in creating pathways for participation in the food sys-
tem and towards the creation of alternatives. When we
refer to conflicts surrounding GMOs, the different cir-
cumstances in the two countries should be kept in mind.
However, our intention is not to draw comparisons be-
tween Germany and Poland, but rather to use data and
results from these two different countries to develop
a more comprehensive notion of food democracy. Our
analysis draws on the work of the social-ecological re-
search group “PoNa” (‘Shaping Nature,’ funded by the
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research in
the funding priority social-ecological research), which
studied the relationship between nature and politics
and how understandings of nature and politics are
manifested in conflicts, including those over GMOs
(Gottschlich & Mölders, 2017). The empirical data con-
sists of: (1) 14 qualitative interviews (Interviews 1–14)
with opponents of GMOs (ten from Germany and four
from Poland) involved in local, national or transnational
conflicts; (2) transcripts of discussions in two focus
groups with anti-GMO activists, including scientists and
members of environmental non-governmental organisa-
tions and agricultural associations from Germany and
Poland; (3) documents from both countries, such as tran-
scripts of parliamentary debates and government reg-
ulations (laws, directives, etc.) published in the period
2004–2012; and (4) results of our iconographic analy-
sis of flyers, posters and book covers shown in 2012 on
the websites of the parties involved in the GMO debate
(Gottschlich & Sulmowski, 2017). This empirical data is
supplemented by a review of relevant literature.
In our analysis, we combine a deductive with an in-
ductive methodology. On the one hand, we apply our
theoretical understanding of food democracy presented
above to analyse anti-GMOmovements in the two coun-
tries. On the other, we use the results of this analysis to
develop and deepen our understanding of food democ-
racy as manifested in conflicts surrounding GMOs.
3.3. Movements against GMOs—Insights from Germany
and Poland
In the following section, GMO conflicts are considered
as cases to address our research question regarding how
conflicts over GMOs contribute to a democratization of
society–nature relations.
Although protests against GMOs took place prior to
the year 2000, social movements against them have
grown significantly in Germany and Poland since the turn
of the millennium. At the end of the 1990s, there were
still few signs of public opposition to developments in
the field of genetic engineering and researchers asked
why politicization was not taking place (e.g., Hoffmann,
1997). One barrier to the growth of an anti-GMO move-
ment was that GMO crops were still not being cultivated
in Europe, so critiques remained on a conceptual level
(Hoffmann, 1997). With the introduction of the coexis-
tence policy in 2001 (analysed in detail below) and the
abolition of the EUmoratorium on the approval of GMOs
in February 2004 (permitting GMO cultivation from 2005
onward), various processes were simultaneously set in
motion. First, the focus of conflicts shifted to the level
of decisions by individual farmers on whether to culti-
vate GMOs (cf. Friedrich, 2017; Vogt, 2007). Second, this
meant that the debate regarding cultivation shifted to
rural areas (cf. Friedrich, 2017; Vogt, 2007). Third, local
conflicts that broke out in rural areas gave rise to na-
tional and transnational movements against the use and
release of GMOs in agriculture (Seifert, 2013). Fourth,
these movements criticized the narrow focus on indi-
vidual decisions and economic impacts and succeeded
in placing the issue of food production on the political
agenda (Gottschlich, 2017b).
A key target of anti-GMO protests is the EU’s pol-
icy of ‘coexistence,’ which allows the cultivation of GM
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crops, while envisioning that certain agricultural areas
will remain ‘GMO free.’ This policy, introduced by the EU
in 2001, thus attempts to skirt around the controversial
question “GMOs—yes or no?” by answering “yes” and
“no” at the same time. A notable effect of this policy has
been to reduce the conflict over GMOs to the level of eco-
nomic interests. The only impact of GMO use taken into
consideration is the possible contamination of non-GM
crops on neighbouring farms and consequent economic
losses (since crops grown on these farms can no longer
bemarketed as GM-free). The policy stipulates that GMO
growers should compensate for these economic losses
in accordance with the polluter pays principle. The ex-
clusive focus on economic issues is explicit in the legisla-
tion. For example, apart from legislation in a fewGerman
federal states covering distances between GM crops and
nature reserves, liability and distance rules intended to
mitigate impacts on ‘GMO-free areas’ apply only to ar-
eas used for the commercial cultivation of food. One in-
terviewee whose private garden was affected by a reg-
istered area of genetically modified maize in a neigh-
bouring field (Interview 2), described how he had asked
the Federal Office of Consumer Protection to require
the farmer to increase the distance between the GM
maize and the maize in the garden, in accordance with
the provisions of the GenTG. However, the application
was rejected on the grounds that the Act only applied
to commercial use; since maize in the garden was not
grown commercially, it was not protected under the law
(Interview 2). Opponents of GMOs fear that, given the
systemic nature of the risks associated with the technol-
ogy, ‘coexistence’ will make GMO-free agriculture impos-
sible in the long term (Bethwell, Weith, & Müller, 2012,
p. 238; Stoppe-Ramadan & Winter, 2010, p. 121; Winter
& Stoppe-Ramadan, 2012, p. 196). While some scientists
hold that the distribution of pollen beyond directly adja-
cent property can be controlled, the effort required to
achieve this through changes in agricultural practice and
coordination among neighbours is very high. Moreover,
such efforts are not always successful (Schimpf, 2008)
and, even in cases where cross-pollination may seem
unlikely on a theoretical level, the risk of the uncon-
trollable spread of transgenes is not manageable (Clark,
2004, p. 104).
Themovement against GMOs has helped bring about
political changes at a local, national and European level.
Protesters have transformed public debate by carrying
out a wide range of actions (see Table 1) that put pres-
sure on political representatives and economic actors.
The anti-GMO actors involved also participate in inter-
national groups that attempt to influence European and
global political processes (Ansell, Maxwell, & Sicurelli,
2006; Seifert, 2013, 2017).
An analysis of the actions and approaches of the anti-
GMOmovement in Germany and Poland reveals that the
anti-GMO movement uses criticism and direct action to
resist the introduction of GMOs. At the same time, it en-
gages in positive action to develop countervailing power
structures that promote food democracy (see Section 4).
These two forms of action are complementary; both con-
tribute towards achieving themovement’s overall goal of
GM-free food production (see Table 1).
The systematization in Table 1 highlights the diversity
of forms of both resistance and positive actionwithin the
anti-GMO movement. It also distinguishes among differ-
ent ‘levels’ of action. These can be viewed as represent-
Table 1. Forms of resistance and positive action adopted by the anti-GMO movement.
Level of escalation Resistance Positive action
1st Level Protest as radical criticism
e.g., flyers, information material, protest bike
rides, telephone calls, tractor demonstrations,
street protests, petitions, balloon and postcard
campaigns, identification of ‘crime scenes’
(unregistered GMO fields in Poland), critiques
exposing the economic bias in the coexistence
principle
Identification of alternatives
e.g., alternative tillage methods and crop
rotation, campaigns for diversity in seed supply
2nd Level Institutional non-cooperation
e.g., refusal to participate in round tables
(justified with reference to the precautionary
principle as set out in Art. 20a of the German
constitution)
Institutional innovation
e.g., development of alternative information
systems, such as the journal Unabhängige
Bauernstimme (Independent Farmers’ Voice)
and the Informationsdienst Gentechnik
(Genetic Engineering Information Service)
3d Level Civil disobedience
e.g., open disregard for laws, for example
destruction of GMO crops in fields
Civil usurpation
e.g., occupation of fields and pre-emptive
sowing (‘Gegensaat’) of organic seeds, new
alliances as a countervailing force for a
‘bottom-up’ agricultural policy
Source: Modified according to Gottschlich (2017b), in line with Ebert (1983).
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ing an ‘escalation’ of the conflict, in the sense that they
are expressions of the increasing scope and ambition of
anti-GMO protests.
At the first level of conflict, resistance takes the form
of creative protests against GMO cultivation. Opposition
to GMOs is expressed through the distribution of flyers,
stickers and postcards and in various types of demonstra-
tions. Many of these actions target those involved in the
cultivation of GMOs, and are often organized by those
directly affected, including farmers, gardeners, and bee-
keepers. One farmer reported that sometimes a phone
call from another colleague was enough to dissuade a
farmer who had registered an area for the cultivation
of GMOs from actually doing so (Interview 3). In some
cases, public protest in the form of bicycle tours from
field to field prompted individual farmers to rethink their
approach (Interview 4). In 2009 high-profile demonstra-
tions carried out by anti-GMO activists in Poland on be-
half of Greenpeace (Interview 11) identified ‘GMO crime
scenes’ (i.e., the unofficial, unregisteredGMO fieldsmen-
tioned in Section 2). While the immediate aim of these
actions is to dissuade farmers from cultivating GMOs,
they also attempt to highlight the importance of GMOs
as an issue of public concern. In this sense, activists call
for a rejection of the principle of coexistence that, by en-
abling both the cultivation of GM crops and GM-free agri-
culture, devolves decision-making onGMOs to individual
farmers. At this level, positive action by the anti-GMO
movement focuses on promoting alternatives. Examples
from our study include proposals for alternative farming
methods and for diversity in seed supply.
At the second level, positive action focuses on creat-
ing alternative institutions such as information systems,
newsletters or journals, while resistance is characterized
by institutional non-cooperation. For example, in 2009,
in response to increasing conflict, which had led to culti-
vation of MON810 being banned that year, the German
ministries of agriculture and education launched a joint
Round Table on Plant Genetics. The Round Table met
a total of four times. However, most of its members
were representatives of organizations in favour of GMOs.
The chairman of the Federal Ecological Food Industry
(Bund Ökologische Lebensmittelwirtschaft [BÖLW]) com-
mented: “This round table is…an extremely one-sided
event” (quoted in Schmid, 2010, authors’ translation).
At the third meeting in June 2010, all participating en-
vironmental NGOs (Deutscher Naturschutzring [DNR],
BÖLW, Naturschutzbund Deutschland e.V. [NABU], Bund
für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland [BUND], and
Greenpeace) announced their decision towithdraw from
the round table. They justified their decision by stat-
ing that the answers received from the Federal Ministry
of Education and Research (BMBF, 2010) to their “Nine-
Point Catalogue for Ecological Safety Research,” submit-
ted before the previous meeting, were unacceptable in
both content and form. The NGOs had substantiated
their demands in this “catalogue” with scholarly cita-
tions, while the BMBF’s reply contained claims that were
not supported by a single scholarly source (DNR, NABU,
BÖLW, & Vereinigung deutscher Wissenschaftler, 2010,
p. 1). The NGOs also responded publicly to the BMBF’s
assertion that it is “not the task of the state to evalu-
ate the usefulness or desirability of non-hazardous so-
cial action, such as research into and use of green ge-
netic technology” (BMBF, 2010, p. 8). The NGOs coun-
tered that, according to Article 20a of the German consti-
tution (Federal Republic of Germany, 2019), it is indeed
the task of the state to protect the general public against
unjustifiable risks and dangers. The precautionary prin-
ciple and the orientation towards sustainability are laid
down in law and should be complied with.
At the third level of escalation in the conflict, civil dis-
obedience in the form of what protesters referred to as
“field liberations” (which took place in Germany but not
in Poland) is combined with “civil usurpation,” i.e., mea-
sures to actively promote and implement new forms of
agricultural production by sowing organic seeds. At the
same time, new alliances provide the impetus for set-
ting up counter-structures for the formulation and imple-
mentation of an alternative vision for agriculture. These
include alliances that bring together producers and con-
sumers, organic and conventional farmers, and a range
of other actors and associations (farmers’ associations,
nature and consumer protection organisations, political
parties and churches). These alliances have the potential
to build bridges across long-established political divides.
For example, one activist from Poland (Interview 11) re-
ported that she was surprised to see who had supported
the protest against the use of GMOs and described how
the development of mutual understanding helped open
up new possibilities and overcome old prejudices. In her
opinion, the campaigns had the potential to contribute
to the further development of Polish civil society by over-
coming the silence of themedia on important issues such
as GMOs and bringing citizens and politicians into con-
tact. GMO to nie to, the relatively young alliance against
GMOs in Poland, called on people to contact their local
MPs. The activist commented that, for many people, this
was their first direct contactwith politicians and their first
opportunity to remind them that it was their job to rep-
resent the interests of the Polish people (Interview 11).
4. Discussion
How do the empirical findings reported in the previous
section contribute to an understanding of how conflicts
over GMOs can contribute to democratizing society–
nature relations and therefore enable and deepen food
democracy? We first discuss some negative effects of
the policy of coexistence and then highlight different
aspects of the democratizing role played by the move-
ments against GMOs.
The current policy of ‘coexistence,’ which on the sur-
face appears to be a means of avoiding conflict, has in
fact exacerbated conflict, while at the same time creat-
ing obstacles to the development of food democracy.
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In the short-term, coexistence policy exacerbates
asymmetries between industrialized agriculture and al-
ternative agricultural practices, especially in the regions
where GMOs are grown (Binimelis, 2008). The use of
GMOs in agriculture could be especially detrimental to
organic farming, which is expected to be free of GMOs.
Contamination with transgenes would mean that prod-
ucts could no longer be labelled as organic and could
only be sold at lower prices. This would not only cause
economic losses to individual farmers, but also loss of
consumer confidence in organic labels. Similarly, for
beekeepers, the presence of traces of GMOs in their
honey would imply a huge economic loss. In reality, ‘co-
existence’ only guarantees the freedom of choice for
GMO-based agriculture, while impeding development of
other, more sustainable types of agriculture, such as or-
ganic farming.
In the long run it is not possible to avoid contamina-
tion in an open system and, once GMOs have been in-
troduced into an agricultural system, it is questionable
whether any part of that system can remain truly GMO-
free. Given that there is already empirical evidence for
the spread of transgenes beyond the areas and regions
in which GM crops are cultivated, coexistence cannot
be considered a long-term option (Altieri, 2005; Winter,
2009). The disappearance of GMO-free agriculture will
favour the prevailing model of industrialized agriculture
(cf. Binimelis, Monterroso, & Vilella, 2010, p. 90), consol-
idating the processes of market concentration and mo-
nopolization (cf. Howard, 2009), as exemplified by the
merger between Monsanto and Bayer in 2018.
Thus, by granting farmers individual freedom of
choice to decide whether to cultivate GM crops, the pol-
icy externalizes the negative effects of GM-based agri-
culture and denies citizens the freedom to democrati-
cally decide on the future of food systems. For exam-
ple, according to the German federal government, in or-
der to achieve certain sustainability goals, the share of
organic agriculture should increase to at least 20% by
2050 (German Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture,
2019). Clearly in a democratized food system the role
of organic agriculture (and other alternatives to indus-
trialized agriculture) should be the subject of public de-
bate. Coexistence policy, if widely applied, would unilat-
erally cut off these alternative avenues towards sustain-
able food production, and is thus contrary to the princi-
ples of both procedural and substantive food democracy.
While potentially making GMO-free agriculture im-
possible, coexistence policy is designed not only to shut
down debate around the key question if GMOs should
be used at all, but also to prevent public examination of
the societal and socio-ecological impacts of GMO cultiva-
tion. Assessment of risks, narrowly defined as technolog-
ical risks, is carried out by experts, away from the pub-
lic gaze. This reflects a technocratic interpretation of the
precautionary principle, in which non-technical and nor-
mative aspects are considered irrelevant to risk assess-
ment. This technocratic approach favours the bureaucra-
tization of coexistence policy in a way that excludes par-
ticipatory democracy. It denies a voice to the broad ma-
jority of consumers who are against the use of GMOs in
food production (Growth from Knowledge, 2018).
Regarding the social effects of GMO policy, in some
cases the introduction of GMOs led to fruitful processes
of politicization, for example in the form of discussions
regarding the future of agriculture in the regions where
GMOs were grown. More often, however, the imple-
mentation of coexistence policy led to the personaliza-
tion of controversies over economic problems and eco-
logical risks associated with the introduction of GMOs.
These controversies were difficult to mediate as political
and personal aspects were interwoven (Friedrich, 2017).
Coexistence has not given rise to conflict in the sense of
broad democratic discussion processes but rather to an
individualization and economization of the problem, at
the same time as discouraging public debate on wider is-
sues relating to the future of food systems.
Our findings further suggest that top-down participa-
tory procedures like the round tables described above
are insufficient, in themselves, for enabling progress to-
wards food democracy. In this case, it appears that the
terms of reference for the round tables were designed
to exclude in-depth debate and maintain the status quo.
Whether or not this was the intention, the views of the
members of the round table regarding the topic under
discussion, and their expectations regarding the use of
participatory procedures to reach agreement, were so
different that there could be no consensus.
In contrast to these negative impacts of coexistence
policy, our findings indicate that the anti-GMO move-
ments play a democratizing role. As shown in Section 3.3,
there are several starting points leading to the develop-
ment of a range of emancipatory political concepts and
practices of resistance, embodying alternatives to proce-
dural and substantive dimensions of the status quo.
The anti-GMO movement challenges the fundamen-
tal presupposition of coexistence policy that GMO cul-
tivation is a matter of individual choice. Protests ‘in
the field’ assert the right of neighbours, communities
and wider society to have a say in whether or not GM
crops are planted in a particular location. Protests against
GMOs are combined with promotion of alternative agri-
cultural technologies. By presenting a positive vision for
an alternative agriculture future, protesters highlight the
fundamental flaw of the coexistence policy: that the
‘compromise’ it offers is illusory, since it cannot in fact
guarantee the continued existence of non-GMO agricul-
ture. Protesters argue that debates about the future
of agriculture should not be foreclosed by the use of
these risky technologies. Thus, it becomes clear that,
with regard to its substantive dimension, food democ-
racy depends on adoption of the precautionary princi-
ple as a paradigm for agricultural (and other environmen-
tal) policy.
The movement refuses to be co-opted by top-down
processes designed to maintain the status quo. It re-
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sponds by setting up alternative, transformative pro-
cesses that aim to broaden participation and to encour-
age a politicization of the debate. Activists of the anti-
GMO movement combine individual-level, consumer-
oriented approaches (e.g., boycotts) with demands for
a policy environment that guarantees the continued ex-
istence of GMO-free agriculture and availability of GMO-
free food. This approach recognizes that consumers are
key actors in foodproduction systemsbut insists that con-
sumer responsibility cannot and should not replace state
regulation as a guardian of sustainability. Dual strate-
gies such as these are a central characteristic of the
movement: Anti-GMO activists combine their critique of
current policies with both demands for greater say in
decision-making and a vision for an alternative agricul-
tural future. In these actions, the procedural and substan-
tive dimensions of food democracy are intertwined.
Anti-GMO movements challenge the technocratic in-
terpretation of the precautionary principle. This is a key
contribution since precaution is a central element of a
care-centred understanding of sustainability. From this
perspective, precaution encompasses more than risk as-
sessment. In particular, its orientation towards inter-
generational justice requires that regulatory frameworks
should leave choices open to future generations, even if
this means forgoing the use of a technology that offers
short-term benefits or that offers benefits only to a seg-
ment of the population.
The anti-GMO movement builds alliances for the
discussion and implementation of alternative futures
for agriculture and food systems. In Germany, non-
commercial actors whose interests are ignored by the
GenTG organized protests such as demonstrations and
even acts of civil disobedience. All these actions con-
tributed to the procedural dimension of food democracy
by opening up political spaces for negotiation regarding
the (socially desirable) future of nature and agriculture.
Although the cultivation of GMOs has not been a con-
cern for a while, the movement has continued to advo-
cate for broad participation of both producers and con-
sumers in determining the future of food systems, for ex-
ample through large demonstrations organized by the al-
liance “Meine Landwirtschaft/Wir haben Agrarindustrie
satt” (My agriculture/we’re fed up with agro-industry) in
Berlin since 2011.
5. Conclusion and Outlook
This study has analysed some of the conflicts surround-
ing the use of GMOs and how the movements against
GMOs in Germany and Poland contribute to a democra-
tization of society-nature relations. The results show that
the EU’s policy of coexistence has not only failed in its at-
tempt to end the conflict over the use of GMOs, but has
also provoked new conflicts, leading to an entrenchment
of opposing views rather than a constructive debate on
agricultural futures. At the same time, the movements
against GMOshaveopenedup a space of negotiation and
struggle about agricultural futures, including not only al-
ternative ideas, but also practices.
Pro-GMO policies are not anti-democratic and anti-
GMO policies are not pro-democratic per se. However,
our research suggests that pro-GMO policies are incom-
patible with both the substantive and procedural dimen-
sions of food democracy. Any use of GMOs in agriculture
appears to be in contradiction to the concept of care and
the precautionary principle, which are central compo-
nents of the substantive dimension of food democracy.
Consideration of the potential interests of future gener-
ations and the need to leave options open for different
modes of agricultural production, including organic agri-
culture, precludes the use of technologies such as GMOs
that may change both ecosystems and socio-economic
systems irreversibly.
Conversely, anti-GMO movements contribute to de-
mocratizing society–nature relations by challenging the
individualization of conflict and the externalization of
social and environmental impacts that are the result
of giving individual farmers the “freedom to choose”
whether to use GMOs. These movements play a democ-
ratizing role in GMO conflicts and, to the extent that they
are successful, also contribute to the substantive dimen-
sion food democracy. This is illustrated by three posi-
tive outcomes of anti-GMO protests (described above in
Section 3.1): (1) The new EU policy which gives individ-
ual member states the possibility of opting out of GMO
cultivation is, at least in part, a recognition of the multi-
faceted nature of opposition to GMOs—it acknowledges
the need for policy makers to listen to the voices argu-
ing that policy should take into account long-term socio-
ecological interests (and not only short-term economic
ones); (2) BASF’s withdrawal from the genetic engineer-
ing business in Germany is evidence of the potential of
public opposition to alter the trajectory of agricultural de-
velopment; and (3) the decision that new breeding tech-
niques such as genome editing should be covered by the
same legislation as GMOs in the EU corresponds to a key
demand of anti-GMO activists.
Concerning the concept of food democracy that we
have introduced above, it becomes clear that although
the procedural and substantive dimensions of conflicts
around food democracy can be separated analytically, in
practice they are intertwined. This is because participa-
tory procedures are not neutral. Powerful interests pro-
mote top-down forms of participation because the lat-
ter provide a better chance of keeping control of the pro-
cess and determining its outcomes. Conversely, those op-
posed to the status quo struggle to gain recognition for
bottom-up forms of participation that, by their very na-
ture, challenge vested interests.
Food democracy should both fulfil the needs of peo-
ple and sustain nature. Achieving this requires decisions
about how societies organize their agricultural produc-
tion to ensure adherence to the principles of care and
justice, in both process and outcomes. From this perspec-
tive, conflicts over GMOs are about much more than the
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use of a specific technology. The substantive dimension
of food democracy is broader and more complex than
the question: GMOs, yes or no? Other substantive issues
need to be considered, especially in relation to the com-
patibility of agricultural (and associated) practices with
the principle of care towards all those involved in the pro-
duction and consumption of food (e.g., labour standards
or the health of producers and consumers). Moreover,
food democracy should guarantee the (re)productivity of
society and agriculture in the future, thus taking inter- as
well as intragenerational justice into account. There is no
single type of agriculture that does this, but a range of al-
ternatives are emerging from a broadmovement that en-
compasses many forms of small-scale farming practices,
united by their commitment to food sovereignty (such as
community urban gardening and other agro-ecological
forms of food production).
Themovement against GMOs has helped to initiate a
wider debate regarding the role that technological inno-
vation can play in achieving a democratic and sustainable
food production. Developments in new breeding tech-
niques highlight the continuing relevance—and increas-
ing complexity—of these issues. In particular, new breed-
ing techniques once again raise the question of whether
coexistence is a viable model for the future. At present
it is difficult to monitor the spread of genetic changes in-
troduced by new breeding techniques. This raises a new
question: Is it even possible to regulate the conflict on an
economic level through a polluter pays principle, as the
policy of coexistence proposes, if the source and even
the occurrence of pollution are difficult to verify? Here
again, themovements against GMOs are helping to politi-
cize the debate by broadening it out into a wider discus-
sion about food democracy and the future of agriculture.
At the same time such debates have given rise to new
coalitions that are different from those in previous con-
flicts about GMOs. For example, sections of the German
Green Party, that previously opposed GMOs, are now
ambivalent about the use of new breeding techniques.
Both opponents and proponents of new breeding tech-
niques justify their positions with reference to sustain-
ability. This serves as a reminder that sustainability itself
cannot be defined in technical terms, but is always an as-
piration and an ongoing effort, obliged to adapt to ever-
changing circumstances. It highlights the importance of
a critical-emancipatory understanding of sustainability
in providing an analytical and normative framework for
food democracy; one that incorporates practices of resis-
tance, continuous public debate and broad participation
in decision-making and is guided by the principles of care,
precaution, and intra- and intergenerational justice.
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